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[1] Nation-states rarely go to war over water, but it is equally rare that water conflicts in
an international river basin are resolved through cooperation among the riparian countries
that use the shared resources. Gains from cooperation will mean little to individual
riparians unless the required cooperative behaviors are incentive compatible. Cooperative
game theory offers useful insights for assessing cooperative solutions for water conflicts in
international river basins. Applying cooperative game theory concepts such as core,
nucleolus, and Shapley value to Nile water conflicts, we examine the incentive structure of
both cooperative and noncooperative strategies for different riparian countries and
establish some baseline conditions for incentive-compatible cooperation in the Nile basin.
Citation: Wu, X., and D. Whittington (2006), Incentive compatibility and conflict resolution in international river basins: A case
study of the Nile Basin, Water Resour. Res., 42, W02417, doi:10.1029/2005WR004238.
1. Introduction
[2] It may be true that nation-states rarely go to war over
water [Beaumount, 1994; Wolf, 1998], but it is equally rare
that water conflicts in an international river basin are
resolved through cooperation among the riparian countries
that utilize the shared resources. Cooperation in international
river basins has often been hindered by domestic politics,
uncertainty, and high transaction costs. Ruling elites may
shore up political support by exaggerating or exploiting
unresolved water conflicts with neighboring riparians,
whereas undertaking cooperative initiatives may give the
appearance of betraying national interests [Elhance, 2000].
Uncertainty about future supply and demand for water
makes it difficult for riparian countries to enter into the
long-term commitments necessary for reaching cooperative
agreements. Furthermore, the transaction costs involved in
reaching cooperative solutions are often substantial, espe-
cially in basins shared by more than two riparian states.
Successful negotiation of cooperative solutions requires a
substantial outlay of resources over a long period, a condi-
tion rarely possible in international river basins in develop-
ing countries.
[3] As demand for water resources continues to grow,
however, the prospective gains from cooperation in inter-
national river basins can no longer be overlooked. In the
Nile basin, for example, the Nile water is presently used
virtually in entirety by two downstream countries, Egypt
and Sudan. Many upstream riparian countries have become
increasingly assertive in claiming a share of the water
[Waterbury and Whittington, 1998]. Population in these
countries (e.g., Ethiopia and Uganda) is projected to double
or triple in the next 50 years [Whittington, 2004]. Unilateral
actions in water resource development will set these
countries on a collision course, and commentators have
already warned that armed conflicts could arise [Homer-
Dixon, 1994]. Although we believe that the risk of water
wars will turn out to be a false alarm, unresolved water
conflicts can severely hamper the economic development in
the basin as a whole, a dire consequence for the populations
along the Nile, some of which are among the poorest in the
world.
[4] By contrast, the gains from cooperation could be
substantial. Significant losses to evaporation can be pre-
vented if water is stored upstream [Waterbury, 1990;
Guariso and Whittington, 1987]. There is also tremendous
potential for hydropower development in upstream riparian
countries [Waterbury and Whittington, 1998; Waterbury,
2002; Swain, 2002], which could benefit all countries in
the basin. A large surplus of hydropower generated
upstream (e.g., in Ethiopia and Uganda) could provide
much needed energy for downstream countries to expand
agricultural production and foreign exchange for up-
stream producers. Such electricity trades could increase
flows of agricultural output from downstream states to
upstream states, and thus reduce upstream countries’
water requirements for domestic consumption [Whittington
et al., 1995].
[5] However attractive the economic gains from coop-
eration may seem from the perspective of the basin as a
whole, individual riparian countries will remain cool to
such prospects unless they can benefit by acting cooper-
atively. It is thus of paramount importance that the Nile
riparians reach an agreement for equitable sharing of any
gains from cooperation. In recent years scholars have
proposed various allocation schemes based on different
notions of equity in anticipation of the need for guidance
in negotiations that are sure to come. For example,
Beaumount [2000] has proposed dual allocation guidelines:
50% of the water to areas where the flow is generated, and
the remaining 50% to areas of historical use, according to
principles of ‘‘prior appropriation.’’ Van der Zaag et al.
[2002] have suggested an ‘‘equitable’’ allocation scheme
based primarily on population.
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[6] Although allocation schemes thus far have tended to
focus on apportionment of the Nile water itself, greater
benefits from cooperation could come from nonconsump-
tive uses of the water, such as hydropower [Whittington et
al., 2005]. Allocation of the economic benefits of cooper-
ative water utilization thus deserves greater attention. How-
ever, perhaps a more fundamental shortcoming of research
to date is that incentive compatibility for cooperation has
largely been ignored. Cooperation is voluntary by nature,
and the glue for any sustained, voluntary cooperation
among riparian countries would have to be the self-interest
of each participating riparian [Waterbury, 1997].
[7] Two conditions are necessary for any allocation
scheme to be incentive compatible. The first is individual
rationality, which requires that benefits of cooperation
allocated to any participating country must at least equal
what that country would obtain by acting unilaterally. A
critical distinction should be made here between acting
unilaterally and maintaining the status quo. The status quo
is often used as a convenient reference point for compara-
tive projections of the economic benefits of cooperative
behavior, but such results can be misleading. The distribu-
tion pattern created by a status quo scenario heavily favors
the existing primary beneficiaries from the Nile water
(Egypt and Sudan), and it tends to disregard other riparian
countries’ increasing capability to pursue water resource
development projects independently.
[8] The second necessary condition for successful inter-
national cooperation is group rationality, which requires that
the aggregate benefits allocated to any subgroup of riparian
countries be at least the same as what that partial coalition
could achieve on its own. Taking such partial coalitions into
account may complicate analyses because individual ripar-
ian countries are then acknowledged to have many other
options than either acting unilaterally or joining a grand
coalition. However, that admission could actually simplify
and facilitate the negotiation process. Owing to the sym-
metrical nature of the problem, group rationality for other
countries may constrain the maximum share that a particular
country can demand, essentially setting an upper limit for
negotiation.
[9] Our argument in this paper is that incentive compat-
ibility should be given more prominence in the resolution of
international water conflicts in general and in the Nile basin
in particular, and that cooperative game theory may offer a
useful framework for identifying solutions that are incentive
compatible. Three considerations arise here. First, any
cooperative schemes agreed upon in some special circum-
stance may eventually break down if incentive compatibility
conditions such as individual and group rationality are not
satisfied. Second, taking incentive compatibility into ac-
count may reduce the transaction costs of conflict resolu-
tion, because it may narrow the search for potential
cooperative solutions. Third, although the polities and
economies of the Nile riparians are interlinked by factors
beyond the economics of utilizing the Nile water [Dinar
and Alemu, 2000; Waterbury, 2002; Sadoff and Grey, 2002;
Song and Whittington, 2004], an analysis focusing on the
economic incentives for cooperation in water use can equip
leaders in these countries with a better understanding of the
interaction between the economic and noneconomic factors
involved.
[10] Following the pioneering work by Rogers [1969],
cooperative game theory has been applied to interna-
tional river basins in a number of studies [Dufournaud,
1982; Harshadeep, 1996; Becker and Easter, 1997;
Kucukmehmetoglu and Guldmann, 2004]. Cooperative game
theory offers an analytical framework in which economic
gains from basin-wide cooperation, individual rationality,
and group rationality can be considered jointly. By deter-
mining the ‘‘core’’ (an important concept in cooperative
game theory) one may arrive at a set of characteristic
functions that specify minimum benefits under all potential
coalitions (as well as noncooperation). Cooperative game
theory solution concepts such as the Shapley value and the
nucleolus can serve as logical focal points where consider-
ations of incentive compatibility and equity can be simulta-
neously satisfied, as they are rooted in some normative
notions of fairness. Discussion below examines the incentive
structure of both cooperative and noncooperative strategies
for different riparian countries in the cooperative game
theory framework and establishes some baseline conditions
for incentive-compatible cooperation regimes for the Nile
basin.
[11] We first present some of the key characteristics of
Nile water conflicts and the potential for cooperation. We
then apply a cooperative game theory framework for the
Nile basin, using the Nile Economic Optimization Model
[Wu, 2000]. Cooperative game theory concepts and solu-
tions for cooperation in the Nile basin are further reported,
with policy implications. Our analysis concludes with
suggestions for future research.
2. Water Conflicts in the Nile Basin and Potential
for Cooperation
[12] Measured at 6700 km, the Nile is the longest river in
the world. Its basin is shared by 10 countries: Egypt, Sudan,
Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda,
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Eritrea (Figure 1).
Few other major river systems serve so great a number of
vying national interests. Yet water conflicts in the Nile basin
have some characteristics in common with conflicts along
other international rivers. First of all, there is a big gap
between the quantity of water available in the basin and the
amount of water sought by individual riparian countries for
water resource development projects. For example, the
government of Egypt has plans to irrigate an additional
5 million acres by 2025, which would require an additional
20 billion m3 of water annually from the Nile. In Sudan,
irrigation and hydropower projects already on the drawing
board would demand an additional 12 billion m3 of water
beyond its current annual allocation under its 1959 Agree-
ment with Egypt [Knott and Hewitt, 1994]. Furthermore,
Ethiopia, which hitherto has used almost no water from the
Nile, now has ambitious irrigation plans to meet the needs
of a dramatically increasing population. If all the plans on
the drawing boards were enacted, the annual water deficit in
the Nile basin would probably exceed 50 billion m3 (the
commonly cited average mean annual flow as measured at
Aswan is 84 billion cubic meters).
[13] The Nile water conflicts are also characterized by
features unique to the Nile basin, such as downstream
countries’ high dependency on the water, the drastic dis-
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juncture between contribution to and utilization of the Nile
water among the chief riparian countries, and the dominance
of Egypt in political and military power despite its geo-
graphical position at the end of downstream supply. Egypt
contributes essentially nothing to the flow of the Nile, but it
depends upon the Nile for 97% of its water supply, and
currently consumes more than 80% of all Nile water.
Ethiopia, in the uplands, contributes 85% of the water flow
in the Nile basin yet uses almost none of that water for
irrigation. Dominant in political and military power, Egypt
has so far been able to guard its access to a large share of
the Nile water, but upstream countries’ claims to the water
resources in the Nile basin can no longer be ignored, as
populations in these countries are booming [Whittington,
2004]. Homer-Dixon [1994] has observed that ‘‘conflict is
most probable when a downstream riparian is highly
dependent on river water and is strong in comparison to
upstream riparians.’’ On the basis of such characteriza-
tions, the Nile has been considered one of the few
international river systems that has the potential for
breeding armed conflict among its riparian nations.
[14] Despite these sociopolitical tensions, the Nile basin
offers huge prospects for water resource conservation and
development. Much of the Nile water is presently lost to
Figure 1. Nile Basin.
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evaporation and seepage as it flows north toward the
Mediterranean, but such losses can be significantly reduced.
The Main Nile flows through severe desert, where net
evaporation seepage losses are substantial in comparison
to southern reaches of the river. If the water were stored
upstream (in Ethiopia) to reduce such evaporation and
seepage losses, a significant amount of additional water
would become available for use. The White Nile flows
through the Sudd wetlands, where half of its water is lost to
evaporation. Much of that water could be conserved if a
canal were built to bypass the Sudd. The Nile basin is also
amply endowed with potential for hydropower generation.
Table 1 suggests that hydropower development could
become an avenue to economic growth for some upstream
riparian countries. A study done by the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation in 1964 estimated that if implemented, hydro-
power projects along the Blue Nile could bring some of the
best economic returns of any such facilities in the world
[Guariso and Whittington, 1987].
[15] To realize such potentials, the Nile riparian countries
must cooperate with each other. For example, Egypt has long
regarded riparian development projects upstream as potential
threats to its water security, on the basis of an age-old fear
that upstream rivals might withhold the water in times of
crisis. Such fears will not dissipate until the upstream
countries can agree upon a cooperative scheme. No Nile
riparian country now disputes the necessity of cooperation.
Rather, the critical challenge is to identify economic incen-
tives that will persuade all riparian countries to embrace
cooperative strategies. Our goal here is to contribute to
that prospect by establishing some baseline conditions for
incentive-compatible cooperation.
3. Incentive Compatibility and Cooperative
Game Theory
3.1. Cooperative Game Theory Framework
[16] Economic incentives for a riparian country’s coop-
eration are first determined by its hydrostrategic position.
The better that position, the less interest that country will
have in reaching a cooperative agreement [Wolf, 1996].
Thus greater incentives will be required to guarantee its
presence in negotiation or cooperation. For instance, other
things being equal, Ethiopia would have to be given strong
incentives to cooperate with other upstream countries, as
most of the Nile water originates in Ethiopia. The second
determinant for economic incentives is how well a riparian
country can do if it acts unilaterally. This capability is
somewhat related to hydrostrategic position, but it is also
limited by the country’s internal economic and financial
conditions. For example, if that country does not have the
financial resources to launch large-scale water resource
development projects, it may occupy a weaker position in
negotiations, obliged to depend on assistance from other
countries or international organizations to accomplish its
goals. Economic incentives are also determined by a third
factor, a country’s ability to form strong alliances with other
countries. Greater economic incentives to cooperate must be
offered to a country that can secure the bulk of its share
through independent, partial coalitions with one or more
neighbors. Cooperative game theory offers a framework for
analyzing the relative strength of these three determinants
(hydrostrategic position, noncooperative behavior, and
openness to partial cooperative schemes) for the 10 riparian
countries that share the Nile basin, with the aim of identi-
fying economic incentives for cooperation that are appro-
priate for each.
[17] A typical cooperation game consists of three ele-
ments: (1) a set of N players, (2) a set of feasible actions
associated with each possible coalition, and (3) a set of
characteristic functions, one for each coalition in the game.
Although there are 10 riparian countries (potential players)
in the Nile basin, Including every riparian country as an
independent player in the game would thus unnecessarily
complicate our analysis. We instead limit our players to
Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and a hypothetical coalition of
equatorial states. In our analysis the equatorial states’
coalition is assumed to be a single, stable, decision-making
entity established among its constituents.
[18] Treating the equatorial states (Uganda, Kenya, Tan-
zania, Burundi, Rwanda, and Democratic Republic of
Congo) as a single entity is of course unrealistic. Our
analysis thus represents a first step in understanding multi-
party negotiations in the Nile Basin, and a more careful
analysis of the likely behavior of the equatorial states is
surely needed. In addition to the analytical advantages, we
offer four reasons for this simplifying assumption. First,
with the exception of Uganda, the saliency of Nile basin
issues is much less in the equatorial states than in Egypt,
Sudan, and Ethiopia. This is largely because the equatorial
states receive more rainfall than other riparian countries,
and have other important sources of water. Second, the
equatorial states contribute less to the total flow of the
Nile than Ethiopia, the other upstream state, and thus have
less negotiating power. The water claims from countries
such as Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the
Table 1. Irrigation and Hydropower Potential of Nile Basin Countriesa
Country Irrigation Potential, 103 ha Irrigation Area, 103 ha Hydropower Power Potential, MW Hydropower Installed, MW
Burundi 185 14 1366 36
Congo NA 11 530000 2829
Egypt 4434 3266 3210 2825
Eritrea NA 28 NA NA
Ethiopia 3637 190 162000 378
Kenya 352 67 30000 611
Rwanda 160 4 3000 59
Sudan 4843 1946 1900 225
Tanzania 828 190 20000 339
Uganda 202 9 10200 155
aData source is African Development Bank, Policy for Integrated Water Resources Management, February 2000.
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Congo, are likely to be small. Third, with the exception of
hydropower and storage sites in Uganda, there are few
large-scale infrastructure projects on the drawing boards of
the equatorial states. Fourth, because of the high transac-
tion costs of participating in a serious manner in interna-
tional negotiations on the Nile basin, it might well make
sense for the equatorial states to pool their resources and
coordinate their actions.
[19] Each player in the game has three feasible actions
from which to choose: to act unilaterally, to join the grand
coalition that includes all players, or to make partial
coalition(s) with one or more other players. A coalition is
defined as any subset of players (riparian countries) that are
able to make a binding agreement. The coalition of all
players {Egypt-Sudan-Ethiopia-equatorial states} is termed
the grand coalition. Coalitions with more than one member
but fewer than the total number of players are partial
coalitions: for example, {Egypt-Sudan}, {Sudan-Ethiopia},
or {Egypt-Sudan-Ethiopia}. Coalitions with only one mem-
ber, such as {Egypt}, {Sudan}, {Ethiopia}, and {equatorial
states}, represent a situation where a player acts unilaterally.
Table 2 shows all the possible coalitions in our analysis.
[20] The characteristic function of a cooperative game
specifies the extra value created by different coalitions. The
characteristic function can be used to evaluate whether
conditions of individual rationality and group rationality
are satisfied, because unless each riparian country or partial
coalition receives at least the same benefits it would have
obtained on its own, it will have no incentive to participate
in the grand coalition.
3.2. Partial Coalitions in the Nile Basin
[21] Riparian countries along international rivers may
form partial coalitions for a variety of reasons. First, they
may share the same goals. In the Nile basin, for example,
neither Egypt nor Sudan contributes much to the flow of
the river, but both depend heavily upon it. They have a
common interest in securing their water supplies against
increasing pressure to share with upstream countries.
Second, riparian countries may form partial coalitions to
explore mutual advantages. For example, Sudan and
Ethiopia might be good partners in a coalition to develop
water resources of the Blue Nile: with excellent hydro-
power prospects, Ethiopia could provide cheap electricity
to Sudan and use the proceeds from such sales to import
food for its growing population. Third, it is much easier
to form partial coalitions than to achieve a grand coalition
among all riparian countries. Establishing a grand coali-
tion typically requires considerably greater political
resources and expenditure of time and funds. Selected
examples of partial coalitions will illustrate how these
factors interplay.
3.2.1. Egypt-Sudan
[22] As noted above, an Egypt-Sudan coalition is appeal-
ing to both countries because of their similar geopolitical
positions in the Nile basin: both rely heavily on the Nile
water but contribute little to its sources. Forming a partial
coalition would allow them to establish a unified front to
deal with claims from upstream riparian countries. Such a
stance is in fact clearly stated in a clause of the 1959
Agreement: ‘‘to study together [the claims of other Nile
basin states] and adopt a unified view thereon.’’ From
Egypt’s perspective, having Sudan on its side will definitely
help to establish legitimacy for the current allocation of the
Nile water because a water allocation for the partial coali-
tion would include supplies for very poor households in
Sudan, thus addressing the international community’s goal
of poverty alleviation. From Sudan’s perspective, Egypt’s
strong political, economic, and military positions can help
keep water supplies secure.
3.2.2. Sudan-Ethiopia
[23] Although an Egypt-Sudan coalition would increase
negotiation powers for both countries in a larger coalition,
that bond might not be as unshakable as Egypt would hope.
Construction of more Blue Nile storage facilities (mostly in
Ethiopia) would enable Sudan to expand its irrigation
system more rapidly, as water stored in those locations
would be delivered by gravity flow and pumping expenses
would be kept to a minimum. New Blue Nile development
could also better protect Sudan’s existing reservoirs (Rose-
ires, Sennar, Khashm el-Girba) from further siltation and
provide flood control benefits for Sudan. In alliance with
Sudan, Ethiopia might be better positioned in seeking
international financing for its Blue Nile projects than if it
tried to act unilaterally. Or the two countries might pool
their resources to develop Blue Nile projects for joint
benefits. Another important consideration for Ethiopia is
that with Sudan on board, the 1959 Agreement between
Egypt and Sudan, a critical barrier to any new Nile
allocation scheme, might finally be sidestepped.
3.2.3. Egypt-Sudan-Ethiopia
[24] Another potential alliance is a coalition of Egypt,
Sudan, and Ethiopia. Because the Blue Nile projects would
not directly affect the equatorial states, all potential oppo-
sition would effectively be removed in face of this
powerful three-member coalition. Blue Nile projects could
be developed in full. Further benefits of such a coalition
could arise from additional hydropower generation, water
savings from shifting storage upstream from the Aswan
High Dam to Blue Nile dams and joint management of
both White and Blue Nile flows (to the extent that the
White Nile can be managed by control structures in Sudan
and Ethiopia). Those who believe the current alliance
between Egypt and Sudan is hard to break because of
Table 2. List of All Coalitions
Type Coalitions
Coalitions with one member {Egypt}, {Sudan}, {Ethiopia}, and {equatorial states}
Coalitions with two members {Egypt-Sudan}, {Egypt-Ethiopia}, {Egypt-equatorial states},
{Sudan-Ethiopia}, {Sudan-equatorial states}, and {Ethiopia-equatorial states}
Coalitions with three members {Egypt-Sudan-Ethiopia}, {Egypt-Sudan-equatorial states},
{Egypt-Ethiopia-equatorial states}, and {Sudan-Ethiopia-equatorial states}
Grand coalition {Egypt-Sudan-Ethiopia-equatorial states}
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the political economy of the basin might view an Egypt-
Sudan-Ethiopia coalition as a viable extension of existing
powers rather than a dramatic shift. In addition, given the
difficulties of achieving a grand coalition, an Egypt-Sudan-
Ethiopia coalition might be an attractive alternative.
3.2.4. Egypt-Sudan-Equatorial States
[25] Although in recent years much attention has been
directed toward implications of development projects along
the Blue Nile, some early Nile planners believed that joint
development of the White Nile and the Main Nile was the
key to successful management of the basin. For example,
the ‘‘century storage’’ scheme proposed by Hurst et al.
[1946], called for the construction of regulatory facilities
on the White Nile, the Jonglei Canal, an over-year reservoir
in Lake Tana (in Ethiopia), and an additional seasonal
storage reservoir on the Main Nile. The potential of an
Egypt-Sudan-equatorial states coalition has certainly not
escaped the notice of leaders of those countries. In 1991
four equatorial states (Tanzania, Uganda, Congo, and
Rwanda), along with Egypt and Sudan, formed an inter-
governmental organization called Tecconile (Technical
Committee for the Promotion of the Development and
Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin) to foster
information exchange and joint development of the Nile
basin.
[26] It is important to note that a partial coalition will
have an impact on the outcome(s) of final negotiations,
even if it is only potential. In many cases, the prospect or
threat of alternative partial coalition(s), rather than their
existence, is sufficient to influence decisions and actions
by other participants. Countries able to develop multiple
coalitions with different players (whether they do so or
not) are often better positioned to negotiate successfully, as
they can make credible threats of leaving a grand coalition
or abandoning other partial coalitions.
3.3. Nile Economic Optimization Model and the
Characteristic Function
[27] The Nile Economic Optimization Model (NEOM) is
formulated as a nonlinear, constrained optimization problem
designed to determine the annual pattern of water use that
will maximize the sum of economic benefits from irrigated
agriculture and hydropower generation in the Nile basin.
The model includes all the existing reservoirs and irrigation
schemes in the basin, as well as new reservoirs, new
irrigation schemes, and other water resource development
projects (see Figure 2).
[28] Specifically, we have considered five Blue Nile
storage projects located in Ethiopia that were proposed
by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation [1964]: reservoirs
(dams) in Lake Tana, Karadobi, Mabil, Mandaia, and
Border (see Figure 2). These projects would not only
generate large quantities of electricity for Ethiopia but
also provide water savings for the whole basin, because
evaporation losses at Aswan High Dam would be
reduced if water were stored in upstream Blue Nile
dams. Although there may be more attractive alternative
multipurpose sites elsewhere in the Blue Nile basin, the
potential dam projects studied by the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, now on the drawing board for over 40 years,
are all still considered viable options and have remained
under active consideration by Ethiopian water resources
planners.
[29] We have also considered wetland reduction (‘‘con-
servation’’) projects in the White Nile, such as Jonglei I,
Jonglei II, Machar Marshes, and Bahr el-Ghazal. Jonglei I is
a canal from Jonglei to Bahr el-Zeraf to allow the White
Nile flow to bypass the Sudd area, and is expected to
increase downstream water supplies by 3.8 billion m3 once
completed. Jonglei II would involve excavating a parallel
canal alongside Jonglei I and would increase downstream
flow by an additional 3.2 billion m3. The Machar Marshes
project calls for the construction of flood embankments and
a canal from Baro to the White Nile. The Bahr el-Ghazal
projects involve both new embankments and channeliza-
tion. These projects combined would increase downstream
flows by about 4 billion m3. We have also considered the
demolition of Jebel Aulia dam, which would result in water
savings of about 3 billion m3. Also, we have further
considered two storage facilities (Lake Kyoga and Lake
Albert) and six power stations. Total installed capacity of
these power stations has been estimated to reach 2300 MW.




















i,c represents the economic value of water for
irrigation at site i for country c (in US$ per cubic meter),
Qt
i,c represents the quantity of water withdrawal for
irrigation at site i for country c in month t, Pe
i,c is the
electricity price at site i for country c (in US$ per kWh), and
KWHt
i,c is the hydropower generated at site i for country c in
month t. (Constraints to the model are explained in
Appendix A.)
[31] The model uses a time increment of one month and
solves for values of the decision variables St
i (reservoir
storage), Rt




i ) (average net head), and KWHt
i,c (elec-
tricity generated) for a single year to determine (1) the
combination of monthly releases from a specified set of
Nile hydropower generation facilities and (2) the monthly
abstractions at specified sets of irrigation schemes that will
generate the greatest annual economic benefits to the
riparian countries as a whole (The NEOM does not include
the costs of building new control structures, nor does it
include flood control benefits). Table 3 compares the status
quo with projected results for full cooperation in the Nile
basin (assuming the value of water for irrigation is
US$0.05 per cubic meter and value for hydropower is
US$0.08 per kWh). These are not market prices for
irrigation water and electricity in the Nile basin today.
Rather these unit values are used for purposes of illustra-
tion; they are generally consistent with international expe-
rience in well-run irrigation schemes and power systems.
These values should thus be considered illustrative of what
it may be possible to achieve in irrigation and hydropower
generation in the intermediate term, not an accurate
characterization of status quo conditions in the Nile basin
today (see Whittington et al. [2005] for a more detailed
discussion of the sensitivity of the NEOM results to
changes in assumptions about the value of water for
irrigation and the value for hydropower, including differ-
ences among riparians).
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[32] The NEOM formulation has numerous other limita-
tions [Whittington et al., 2005]. It does not explicitly
include the economic benefits of flood control. Water
quality considerations, groundwater flows, and sediment
transport are not incorporated [Falkenmark and Lannerstad,
2005]. The NEOM is a deterministic, annual model that
assumes that the managers of the system know the pattern
of inflows throughout the basin over the coming year; it
does not address the complexity of overyear storage issues.
Most importantly, the capital costs of the infrastructure
development projects are not included. Moreover, to use
the NEOM to calculate the game theory results, the analyst
must make assumptions about the specific infrastructure
projects that (1) each country would build in the absence
of cooperation, and (2) each partial coalition would build
in the absence of the grand coalition.
[33] The game theory results do not incorporate the
transaction costs associated with the multiparty negotiations
required to achieve either partial coalitions or the grand
coalition. To the extent that multilateral donors facilitate and
subsidize these negotiations, ignoring such transaction costs
may not affect our results greatly.
[34] Given these qualifications, the total benefits from
utilizing the Nile waters cooperatively will more than
double the gross benefits available under the status quo.
The task of allocating these benefits is challenging because
riparian countries have hitherto relied on unilateral action or
partial coalitions as the dominant strategies in Nile water
utilization.
[35] Taking individual rationality and group rationality
into account can offer some useful insights into the alloca-
tion of benefits from cooperation. To determine how indi-
Figure 2. Nile Basin as represented in the Nile Economic Optimization Model.
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vidual rationality and group rationality might affect the
strategic choices available to the riparian countries, we
modified the NEOM to derive projected economic benefits
for different hypothetical coalition choices (including uni-



















where j represents a particular coalition status (grand
coalition, partial coalition(s), unilateral action). The objec-
tive is to maximize the sum of economic benefits for that
group (or single country) instead of for the whole basin.
[36] The characteristic function of the Nile cooperation
game is presented in Table 4. The first three rows corre-
spond to the requirements of individual rationality. For
example, Ethiopia will not have an incentive to participate
in any cooperation unless the gross annual benefits allocated
to it are at least US$600 million, the amount it would obtain
by acting unilaterally. It is important to notice that although
Ethiopia’s annual gross benefit is only US$50 million under
the status quo (Table 3), the benefits it can secure by acting
unilaterally would be much larger than that. The remaining
rows correspond to group rationality. The characteristic
function value for each coalition indicates the minimum
extra benefits to be allocated to the group of players in that
coalition if they agree to participate in the grand coalition.
For example, the characteristic function for an Egypt-Sudan
coalition is US$274 million annually: at minimum, US$274
million would be allocated to Egypt and Sudan as a group,
on top of the amounts satisfying the individual rationality
for each. Otherwise Egypt and Sudan would not have the
incentives to join the grand coalition.
4. Core, Incentive-Compatible Cooperation, and
Negotiation
[37] The set of allocations that satisfies both individual
rationality and group rationality can be represented by a
cooperative game theory concept called the core. The core is
a set of all benefit allocation vectors uK, such that Sui  v(I)
and S(i  S)ui  v(S), with I being the grand coalition
composed of all players and S being the set of all possible
coalitions except the grand coalition, while v(I) and v(S) are
payoffs for the grand coalition and for other possible
coalitions. In the context of international river basins, the
core represents the economic incentives necessary to bring
riparian countries into the cooperative scheme. The first
condition, Sui
K  v(I), ensures that the summation of
benefits for riparian countries will be less than the total
benefits available for allocation (an adding-up condition).
The second condition, S(i  S)uiK  v(S), guarantees that
each riparian country will do better by participating in the
full cooperation scheme (i.e., the grand coalition) than by
acting unilaterally or by forming partial coalition(s).
[38] We cannot display the sphere of the core graphically,
as doing so requires four dimensions. However, we can show
the boundary of the core by solving four constrained
maximization problems, one for each player in our game.
The objective function for the maximization problem for
each player is P(i),with i = Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, or the
equatorial states. Benefits can be allocated for each specific
player. Constraints are the adding-up condition and the
individual rationality and group rationality conditions. The
results of these maximization models are reported in Tables 5
and 6. Table 6 displays the lower and upper bounds of the
benefits that can be allocated to each player and compares
these values with the allocation based on full cooperation.
These bounds can be viewed as delimiting the boundary of
the core.
[39] The lower bounds defining the core reflect the ‘‘bot-
tom line’’ for all players in negotiation: a player will have no
incentive to stay with the cooperative scheme if its share
from such an endeavor is less than the lower bound, and the
upper bounds of the core reflect a set of maximum alloca-
Table 4. Characteristic Function of the Nile Cooperation Game
Row Coalition
Benefits of the
Coalition, 106 US$/yr Characteristic Function Value of the Coalition
1 {Egypt} 1,804 V(Egypt) = 1804 (1804-0)
2 {Sudan} 1,029 V(Sudan) = 1029 (1029-0)
3 {Ethiopia} 600 V(Ethiopia) = 600 (592-0)
4 {equatorial states} 1,233 V(equatorial states) = 1233 (1233-0)
5 {Egypt-Sudan} 3,107 V(Egypt-Sudan) = 274 (3107-1804-1029)
6 {Ethiopia-Sudan} 3,131 V(Ethiopia-Sudan) = 1502 (3131-600-1029)
7 {Ethiopia-Egypt} 3,759 V(Ethiopia-Egypt) = 1355 (3759-1804-600)
8 {Egypt-equatorial states} 3,731 V(Egypt-equatorial states) = 694 (3731-1804-1233)
9 {Sudan-equatorial states} 2,990 V(Sudan-equatorial states) = 728 (2990-1029-1233)
10 {Ethiopia-equatorial states} 1,833 V(Ethiopia-equatorial states) = 0 (1833-600-1233)
11 {Egypt-Sudan-Ethiopia} 6,746 V(Egypt-Sudan-Ethiopia) = 3313 (6746-1804-1029-600)
12 {Egypt-Sudan-equatorial states} 5,509 V(Egypt-Sudan-equatorial states) = 1443 (5509-1804-1029-1233)
13 {Egypt-equatorial states-Ethiopia} 5,684 V(Egypt-equatorial states-Ethiopia) = 2047 (5684-1804-1233-600)
14 {Ethiopia-Sudan-equatorial states} 4,642 V(Ethiopia-Sudan-equatorial states) = 1780 (4642-600-1029-1233)
15 Grand coalition 9,112 V(grand coalition) = 4446 (9112-600-1804-1029-1233)
Table 3. Annual Economic Value of Nile Basin Cooperation





Equatorial states 190 1,272
Total 4,180 9,112
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tions a player can possibly request while keeping all other
players in the cooperative scheme. In general, the values of
the lower and upper bounds represent the relative bargaining
power each player has: the higher the bounds, the greater the
bargaining power. For example, Sudan could command a
significant premium for its participation in a cooperative
scheme because it is the only player whose lower bound is
higher than its benefit from acting unilaterally, highlighting
its pivotal role in the search for Nile basin cooperation.
[40] Knowledge of the core can be used in several ways
to assist decision makers or negotiators in dealing with
water conflicts in international river basins. First, the core
can be applied to describe the grounds for potential agree-
ment among riparian countries. In the literature, such
grounds are known as the negotiation set [Luce and Raiffe,
1957] or the contract zone [Bacharach and Lawter, 1981] or
the bargaining arena [Kennedy et al., 1980]. All too often,
the parties involved may come to the table with unrealistic
demands because the reasonable ranges of relevant demands
are unknown to them. Establishing boundaries to negotia-
tion through analysis of the core would expedite the search
for the ultimate viable allocation scheme, thus permitting
primary attention to focus on resolving key differences,
rather than attempting to justify allocations that may be out
of bounds (located outside the core).
[41] Second, knowledge of the core can contribute to the
long-term stability of allocation schemes. For example, a
particular water agreement may serve various political and/
or economic purposes of the moment, but it is unlikely to be
sustained if a fundamental economic rationale is absent.
Boundaries identified by the core can be used as criteria for
economic incentives that all proposed allocation schemes
would have to meet. Until all countries’ expectations
regarding potential demands are located within the core,
the political conditions for serious negotiation may be
lacking.
[42] Third, knowledge of the core can help to gauge
unilateral or group behavior and to anticipate potential
moves. Radford [1977] has characterized negotiation as a
sequence of moves in which adversaries attempt to arrive at
a favorable agreement. Such moves can be communicative
or structural. A communicative move informs players about
the truth or falsehood of their opponents’ stated preferences
or intentions. A structural move is an overt action, commit-
ment, or proposal. Because a country’s bargaining power
will be strengthened by its potential for forming alliance(s)
with other countries, we may expect to see more commu-
nicative moves from the key players toward such goals, but
such moves should not be taken at face value, Sudan may
go out of its way to illustrate to Egypt and Ethiopia that it
can form coalitions with the equatorial states in order to
strengthen its position in negotiations on cooperative de-
velopment of the Blue Nile, but such a move may benefit
Sudan the least judging from its allocation when the benefits
for equatorial states are maximized (Table 5).
5. Nucleolus, Shapley Value, and Fairness
[43] Whereas the core may serve to set boundaries for
negotiation, other game theoretical solutions can be useful
in identifying focal points for negotiation that are incentive
compatible. We now describe and compute two such sol-
utions, the nucleolus and Shapley value, and discuss their
implications for exploring cooperative solutions for water
allocation in the Nile basin.
5.1. Nucleolus
[44] The nucleolus in our case is the allocation that has
the lexicographically smallest associated excesses. For an
allocation uK, the expression v(S)  Pui can be viewed as
the objection raised by a coalition S against this allocation,
and the calculation of the nucleolus identifies the payoff that










[45] It is of special interest to point out that the nucleolus
solution is consistent with Rawls’s notion of ‘‘the veil of
ignorance’’ [Rawls, 1971], that is, it is the allocation that
might be preferred if no player knows his or her future
Table 5. Core of the Nile Allocation Game
Annual Economic Value, 106 US$
Maximizing Egypt Maximizing Sudan Maximizing Ethiopia Maximizing Equatorial States
Egypt 4,170 3,851 2,498 1,804
Sudan 3,109 3,428 1,778 1,339
Ethiopia 600 600 3,603 3,603
Equatorial states 1,233 1,233 1,233 2,366
Total 9,112 9,112 9,112 9,112
Table 6. Boundary for the Core of the Nile Allocation Game
Country
Annual Economic Value, 106 US$
Lower Bound Upper Bound
No Cooperation
(All Players Act Unilaterally)
Egypt 1,804 4,107 1,804
Sudan 1,339 3,109 1,029
Ethiopia 600 3,603 600
Equatorial states 1,233 2,366 1,233
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identity [Loehman, 1995]. Rawls postulates that if people
are unaware of their personal interests and future identities,
they might want to maximize the net benefits to be obtained
from the worst possible outcome that can happen. In fact,
Rawls assumes that every individual would act to ensure
that, whatever course of action was taken by others, she
would receive the ‘‘least worst’’ possible outcome. Thus the
value of any possible action would depend wholly on the
worst possible outcome regardless of how small its possi-
bility. An allocation based on Rawls’s theory would give
absolute priority to the interests of the most disadvantaged
party.
[46] Computationally, the nucleolus can be found by
solving the min-max problem given above subject to the
constraints of the core, which implies that the nucleolus
would satisfy the conditions for both individual rationality
and group rationality. Using the general algebraic modeling
system (GAMS) linear programming algorithm to solve the
above optimization problem, the nucleolus of this allocation
game can be determined as shown in Table 7. (Because it is
not easy to give a general formula to calculate the nucleolus,
mathematical software with an optimization algorithm is
often used for computation.)
[47] One of the critiques of the nucleolus is that it
considers only the excess benefits of a coalition, not the
size of the coalition (the number of players in a given
coalition). The per capita nucleolus, a variant of the nucle-
olus, can alleviate this problem. In computing the per capita
nucleolus, we replace v(S)  Pui with (v(S)  Pui)/r,
with r being the size of the coalition S.. Using this new
formulation, we see in Table 7 that the per capita nucle-
olus gives more weight to Egypt and Sudan.
[48] The nucleolus can be a very useful solution when
applied to international water conflicts. First, it may be an
appealing option when an arbitrator is called in to decide
upon the final allocation but negotiators are unsure of
the arbitrator’s preferences about the allocation. Second,
because the nucleolus is necessarily contained in the core,
it ensures the economic incentives automatically. Third,
because the nucleolus (especially per capita nucleolus)
tends to equalize the claims of all participants, a nucleolus
solution might approximate a proposal for equalizing the
excess benefits for all players.
5.2. Shapley Value
[49] Another point solution that can yield important
practical implications to water conflicts is the Shapley
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v Sð Þ  v S  ið Þ½ ; ð4Þ
where N is any finite carrier of v. To interpret this formula,
consider the players in N to be randomly ordered, with
every ordering equally possible. Player i’s marginal
contribution to coalition S is defined as [v(S)  v(S  i)],
and the weight assigned to coalition S is the probability that
the predecessors of player i in the random ordering, which
can be computed as (s  1)!(n  s)!/n!. Thus the Shapley
value for player i is an average of player i’s marginal
benefits from all coalitions, including the empty set. Note
that the formula for calculating the Shapley value is not
bounded by conditions such as individual rationality and
group rationality.
[50] The Shapley value represents a distinctive approach
to the problems of complex strategic interaction in a coop-
erative game framework, and it is perhaps the most useful of
all cooperative game theoretical solution concepts. It pro-
vides an index of each player’s strength in terms of the
strength of the coalition(s) of which the player is a member,
relative to those in which the player is not a member. Because
it imposes equal treatment on players who make the same
contribution in the game [Tisdell and Harrison, 1992], the
Shapley value is often used as a benchmark of fairness.
[51] Although Ethiopia and the equatorial states contrib-
ute to all of the flow of the Nile basin, the significance of
that contribution will be balanced by unique contributions
made by downstream riparian countries. For example, we
have assumed that in any coalition lacking Egypt’s pres-
ence, modifications to the Jebel Aulia, as well as wetland
projects in the White Nile and at least two reservoirs in the
Blue Nile, will not be completed. That is, the effects of
Egypt’s absence from such a coalition can be used to project
the magnitude of its potential contribution were it to be
present in a cooperative solution. This contribution, along
with the fact that Egypt is able to obtain a high level of
economic benefits on its own, will entitle Egypt to a sizable
share from cooperation, even though it does not contribute
to the flow of the river.
[52] One of the more unrealistic aspects of the Shapley
value solution in water allocation games is its assumption of
symmetry. Symmetry implies that any coalition with the
same number of players will have the same probability of
being formed and that each player will have the same
probability of joining these coalitions. However, in the
context of international river basins, there are several factors
that might make some coalitions easier to form than others.
For example, an Egypt-Sudan coalition might be more
likely to occur than coalitions such as Egypt-Ethiopia or
Ethiopia-equatorial states. Specific political constraints may
result in zero probability for some coalitions. In addition,
the order in which players enter a particular coalition or
grand coalition may matter. For example, Sudan is probably
less likely to be the last player to join the grand coalition
than are Ethiopia or the equatorial states. Furthermore, lack
of symmetry can also arise when players have different
bargaining abilities or diplomatic resources.
[53] A generalized (or weighted) Shapley value can be
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Table 7. Nucleolus of the Nile Allocation Game







Equatorial states 1,800 1,516
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[54] An important aspect of calculating the generalized
Shapley value is to determine the value of ri for all players
in various coalitions. This task can become extremely
complicated, as different players (and analysts) may assign
different weights to ri on the basis of differing knowledge
and belief. To illustrate such effects, we specify a scenario
in which the following assumptions are implied: (1) Be-
cause Egypt and Sudan are more likely to be involved in
certain kinds of coalitions, there is less chance that either
will act unilaterally. (2) Either Ethiopia or the equatorial
states’ coalition will likely be the last to join the grand
coalition. (3) There is no chance that Sudan will be the last
to join the grand coalition.
[55] Table 8 gives a comparison of the probability
weights between Shapley value and generalized Shapley
value, for each possible coalition. In the first column the
names in parentheses indicate coalition members preceding
i. Some coalitions have been assigned zero probability.
Though all potential partial coalitions may be admissible
in theory, not all of them are feasible in practice, or at least
not all of them have equal probability of realization. For
example, coalitions such as Egypt-Ethiopia, Egypt-equato-
rial states, or Egypt-equatorial states-Ethiopia are likely to
encounter an implementation problem, as Sudan can uni-
laterally disrupt these coalitions by diverting more water.
The Ethiopia-equatorial states coalition may also have low
probability of occurring because it does not provide much
excess benefit compared with unilateral action for these two
parties.
[56] Note that weights for both Egypt and Sudan de-
creased when Shapley value is generalized: that is, their
bargaining powers decline, along with economic share
(Table 9). This may seem surprising in view of the prom-
inent treatment we have given to an Egypt-Sudan coalition.
However, Ethiopia and the equatorial states, which cannot
join the grand coalition until Egypt and Sudan are in
(assumption 2 above), find their negotiation leverage rela-
tively increased. This overall shift in power may arise
because an Egypt-Sudan coalition will perform less well if
White Nile power stations are not built, which could happen
only if the equatorial states are brought into the deal. In
addition, Ethiopia and the equatorial states’ position as the
last and marginal players may enhance their bargaining
powers: a marginal player can literally hold up the grand
coalition unless compensated handsomely.
5.3. An Assessment of Game Theoretical Solutions
[57] The differences we see between the Shapley value
and nucleolus will have been anticipated, as the two are
rooted in different normative notions of fairness. The
Shapley value is more egalitarian than the nucleolus,
because the nucleolus gives priority to the most dissatisfied
coalition(s), whereas the Shapley value grants all coalitions
equal status. The Shapley value and the nucleolus also differ
in their relationship with the core. The nucleolus is derived
from core-minded thinking and thus automatically belongs
to the core. The Shapley value is derived from reasonable
set thinking; its occurrence within the core is more by
accident than by design.
[58] Some common criteria are needed to evaluate and
reconcile the solutions derived from these competing
notions of fairness. The first criterion we employ here is
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economic incentive necessary for each riparian country to
participate in cooperation. Solutions or proposals that do not
fall within the core need to be revised before they can be
seriously considered in negotiation or political processes.
Nucleolus solutions will always fall within the bounds of the
core. However, solutions based on Shapley values, which
may or may not happen to fall within the core, require
further scrutiny and adjustment.
[59] Our second criterion is the magnitude of the differ-
ences between these solutions and a potential focal point for
the players. Given that four players are involved and that the
core involves a set of complex relationships among the
various players, sorting out a potential focal point becomes
a formidable problem. We can simplify the task by splitting
the difference for each of the four players. On the basis of
maximum and minimum value for each player as shown in
the core of the game (Table 6), splitting the difference
would yield the allocation shown in Table 10. We may then
compute the differences between this allocation and each of
the solutions or proposals, to see which one(s) will be closer
to this hypothetical focal point.
[60] A third useful criterion for assessing different sol-
utions is the propensity to disrupt. Player i’s propensity to
disrupt is defined as the ratio of other players’ loss, if i
refuses to cooperate, to i’s loss from refusing to cooperate.
For example, in the Nile allocation game Ethiopia’s pro-
pensity to disrupt can be calculated as [P(Egypt) + P(Sudan)
+ v(The equatorial states)  v(Egypt-Sudan-The equatorial
states)]/P(Ethiopia)  v(Ethiopia). It is clear that on this
basis the higher a player’s propensity to disrupt, the more
negotiation power that player will have in the game.
[61] Table 11 compares nucleolus, per capita nucleolus,
Shapley value, and generalized Shapley value solutions for
our Nile basin cooperation game in terms of each of the three
evaluative criteria we have described. All of these game
theoretical solutions satisfy the requirements of the core.
Thus each provides an acceptable estimation of economic
incentives necessary to induce cooperative behavior. When
measured against the sum of the absolute value of the
differences between the four solutions analyzed and the
allocations associated with the focal point, each solution
differs greatly from the others, ranging from US$131
million for the Shapley value solution to US$921 million
for the generalized Shapley value solution. High differ-
ences from focal point normally signal the presence of big
winner(s) and big loser(s). Such solutions might face
heavier resistance in implementation. In that event, the
Shapley value is an appealing solution, with all values
close to the focal point and relatively low prospects for
disruption. If a particular country’s propensity to disrupt is
an issue of concern, the generalized Shapley value solution
will be the least favored by Egypt and Sudan and most
favored by Ethiopia and equatorial states. The per capita
nucleolus solution offers Ethiopia, Sudan and Ethiopia
sufficient incentives to form the grand coalition. The focal
point yields equal propensity to disrupt for all riparian
countries, suggesting that an equilibrium could perhaps be
established in that solution.
6. Concluding Remarks
[62] A critical barrier to cooperative water utilization in
international river basins is that there is no clear rule for
allocating the gains from prospective cooperation among
the riparian countries that participate. As a result, the
economic gains from cooperation may mean very little to
individual riparian countries if the economic incentives for
participating in cooperative schemes are not guaranteed. In
this article we have shown that game theoretical concepts
and solutions can help to identify such incentive-compatible
cooperative solutions for the Nile basin.
[63] Knowledge of the core of the game cannot serve to
pinpoint a single solution to water conflicts, but it can
establish limits that exclude allocations that should never be
considered, thus narrowing the set of possible solutions. The
core is based on considerations of individual rationality and
group rationality. For example, an allocation scheme that
grants an individual country less than it would achieve on
its own cannot be counted as a viable solution. Similarly,
when building a grand coalition, a partial coalition (allied
subgroup) must be allocated combined benefits that exceed
what its members can collectively achieve on their own. By
determining and comparing such prospective benefits for
the array of possible coalitions, it becomes possible to
establish boundaries for determining solutions to the Nile
water allocation game.
Table 9. Shapley Value and Generalized Shapley Value
Country
Shapley Value Generalized Shapley Value
Economic Value, 106 US$ Share, % Economic Value, 106 US$ Share, %
Egypt 2,960 32 2,835 31
Sudan 2,280 25 1,900 21
Ethiopia 2,049 22 2,386 26
Equatorial states 1,823 20 1,987 22
Table 10. A Hypothetical Focal Point for the Nile Water Allocation Game
Annual Economic Value, 106 US$
Maximizing Egypt Maximizing Sudan Maximizing Ethiopia Maximizing Equatorial States Splitting the Difference
Egypt 4,170 3,851 2,498 1,804 3,081
Sudan 3,109 3,428 1,778 1,339 2,414
Ethiopia 600 600 3,603 3,603 2,102
Equatorial states 1,233 1,233 1,233 2,366 1,516
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[64] Analyses of game theoretical solutions such as the
Shapley value and the nucleolus can help decision makers
and negotiators from riparian countries to identify the
sources and magnitude of their bargaining powers and to
gauge how such powers may fare in differing circumstan-
ces. For example, benefits for Ethiopia and the equatorial
states increase markedly if a Shapley value solution is
modified to a generalized Shapley value solution. Those
countries may accordingly benefit from waiting to be the
last to join in cooperation. When a hypothetical focal point
is established by splitting the differences for the core, the
Shapley values for these upstream riparian countries closely
approximate that point. In combination these results make a
Shapley value approach an attractive guiding concept for
solutions to allocation problems.
[65] The cooperative game theory framework established
in this article can also serve as a basis for designing gaming
exercises for training purposes or for actual negotiations
among riparian countries. One example might be an inter-
active game in which each participant in a particular
gaming session would represent a riparian country and
negotiate with other players over the terms of a potential
agreement on water allocation. The game could be designed
to simulate an actual negotiation process in which decision
makers and negotiators are required to make decisions, over
several sessions, on a set of strategic choices such as
entering an agreement with other riparian countries, form-
ing partial coalitions with other riparian countries, or taking
unilateral actions. At the end of each session, scores could
be displayed indicating the economic benefits obtained for
each country by its representative player. Such gaming
exercises can generate valuable insights for decision makers
and negotiators as a preparatory phase before undertaking
formal negotiations.
[66] For students of the Nile basin, some of the results of
this specific application of game theory are of particular
interest. Waterbury [2002] described Sudan as ‘‘the Master
of the Middle,’’ and highlighted the critical role Sudan
would play in the search for basin-wide cooperative sol-
utions. Our modeling results confirm this insight: the core
of the game suggests that Sudan could command a signif-
icant premium for its participation in a cooperative scheme
because it is the only player whose lower bound is higher
than its benefit from acting unilaterally. Of course, the fact
that Sudan has this power does not necessarily mean that
she will use it to her neighbors’ disadvantage.
[67] Interestingly, in many solutions Egypt’s willingness
to cooperate will be high as seen from relatively low
propensity to disrupt. This result will perhaps surprise some
observers, but it simply reflects the fact that Egypt benefits
significantly from most cooperative solutions (and is most
at risk from unilateral actions by upstream riparians).
Similarly, Ethiopia benefits greatly from most cooperative
solutions. The fact that most of the Nile waters originate in
Ethiopia is not a good reason for Ethiopia to avoid coop-
eration on river basin development. Indeed, in terms of the
benefit allocations that we examined, Ethiopia stands to
gain the most (in both absolute and relative terms) from
joining the grand coalition, relative to the status quo.
[68] Perhaps the main lesson from our analysis is that all
Nile riparians stand to gain substantially from the grand
coalition, and that there are numerous benefit sharing rules
that seem both feasible and equitable.
Appendix A: Constraints of NEOM
[69] 1. Continuity constraints for reservoir nodes,
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for t = 1, 2, 3 . . . 12.
Table 11. An Assessment of Game Theoretical Solutions
Solution Allocation







Egypt 3,051 85 0.90
Sudan 2,309 77 0.87
Ethiopia 1,952 157 1.22
Equatorial states 1,800 7 1.00
2. Per capita nucleolus satisfied
Egypt 2,996 30 0.98
Sudan 2,255 23 0.96
Ethiopia 2,344 235 0.72
Equatorial states 1,516 290 3.00
3. Shapley value satisfied
Egypt 2,960 6 1.05
Sudan 2,280 48 0.92
Ethiopia 2,049 60 1.07
Equatorial states 1,823 17 0.92
4. Generalized Shapley value satisfied
Egypt 2,835 131 1.29
Sudan 1,900 332 1.75
Ethiopia 2,386 277 0.68
Equatorial states 1,987 181 0.50
5. Hypothetical focal point satisfied
Egypt 2,966 - 1.04
Sudan 2,232 - 1.00
Ethiopia 2,109 - 0.99
Equatorial states 1,806 - 0.98
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t þ I it ¼ Rit þ Qi;ct ; ðA2Þ
for t = 1, 2, 3 . . . 12 (j indicates nodes immediate before i
and can be more than one node).
[71] 3. Storage capacity constraints for reservoir nodes,
SiMin  Sit  SiMax: ðA3Þ
[72] 4. Irrigation water withdrawal pattern,
Qi;ct ¼ Qi;cdit; ðA4Þ
for t = 1, 2, 3 .. 12.
[73] 5. Hydropower generation equations,
KWHi;ct ¼ hRitf Sit ; Sitþ1
 
e; ðA5Þ
for t = 1, 2, 3 .. 12.
[74] 6. Hydropower generation capacity constraints,
KWHi;ct  CAPi;c; ðA6Þ
for t = 1, 2, 3 . . . 12







t  0; ðA7Þ
for all the decision variables and for t = 1, 2, 3 . . . 12.
[76] St
i is reservoir storage for reservoir i in month t; It
i is
the inflow to site i in month t; Rt
i = the release (or the
outflow) from site i in month t; EVt
ji is the percentage of
evaporation loss for water flowing from site j (where j
indicates immediate nodes before site i, and can be more
than one) to site i; et
i is the evaporation rate at site i in month
t; rt
i is the addition to flow at site i in month t due to rainfall;
ai and bi are the constant and the slope of the area storage
relation of the reservoir, respectively; SMin
i and SMax
i are the
minimum and maximum storage for any reservoir at site i;
Qi,c is the irrigation withdrawal for irrigation site i in
October; dt
i = the coefficients of irrigation withdrawal for
site i in month t in relation to irrigation withdrawal for site i
in October; h is unit conversion constant; f(St
i, St+1
i ) is
function determining average productive head; e is hydro-
power efficiency; and CAPi,c is the maximum hydropower
that can be generated at site i in month t.
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